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extent aid is allocated according to the principles of this "canonical" model. This paper shows 
that it is legitimate for donors to simultaneously use other selectivity criteria corresponding 
either to expected factors of aid effectiveness or to handicaps to development. It is notably 
argued  that  vulnerability  to  exogenous  shocks  and  low  level  of  human  capital  should  be 
considered as selectivity criteria. Taking these other criteria into account dramatically changes 
the assessment of donor selectivity.  
 
 












*   Agence Française de Développement (AFD)  -  amprouj@afd.fr  
** Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI) CNRS-Université 
d’Auvergne  -  P.Guillaumont@u-clermont1.fr 
 
This  paper  has  been  presented  at  the  « Development  Economics  Meeting »  organized  by  the  Association 
française de sciences économiques (French Economics association) in May 2005 and at a meeting of the Expert 
Group on Development Issues (EGDI), Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2005. In both cases it 
benefited from very useful comments, strongly acknowledged. Some elements of this paper have also been 
incorporated into a lecture given by P.Guillaumont at the ABCDE Conference in Amsterdam may 2005. The 
authors would also like to acknowledge editorial support by Gill Gladstone and help from Catherine Korachais 
for the graphs. Usual disclaimers apply. 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
 
  3 
1. Introduction  
 
Not all countries have the same capacity to effectively use external assistance to promote their 
development. With the decline in international aid during the 1990s, the issue of aid allocation 
and its effectiveness naturally came into the spotlight. This gave rise to the concept of "aid 
selectivity", which refers to the quality of aid allocation, the most selective aid being that 
which  maximises  the  effectiveness  with  regard  to  the  set  objectives.  Although  the 
international community has since made the commitment to significantly increase the volume 
of development aid, the issue of selectivity remains high on the agenda. 
 
Since aid selectivity is defined as the quality of its allocation, assessing selectivity implies 
comparing actual allocation to what would be an optimal one. Research on “good allocation” 
has gone through two phases. In a first long-lived phase, the literature sought to identify, from 
among the explanatory factors of allocation, those which represented the recipient countries’ 
needs, as opposed to the donor countries’ interests. "Good allocation" was deemed to be that 
which met the recipient countries’ needs (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Berthélémy and Tichit, 
2004; Berthélémy, 2004, Canavire et al,. 2005). In a second, more recent phase, some authors 
(Collier and Dollar 2000, 2001, Dollar and Levin, 2004; Roodman, 2004) have sought to 
establish selectivity indicators by examining to what extent aid is allocated to countries where 
it is likely to be the most effective. These works referred primarily to the analysis of Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) on aid effectiveness. The present paper focuses on the second phase. One 
reason for this choice is that the World Bank and the IMF, in their Global Monitoring Report 
(2004 and 2005) make unquestioning reference to Dollar and Levin’s study, which tends to 
give it some political credence that could well impact donor behaviour. The main message of 
these works on selectivity indicators is that selectivity is to be assessed from the level of 
income (or poverty) and the quality of policy (governance) of recipient countries. 
 
This paper argues that these analyses of selectivity indicators raise significant methodological 
problems, which heavily influence the assessment of aid selectivity for both bilateral and 
multilateral donors.  It also considers as legitimate for donors to simultaneously use other 
selectivity  criteria  corresponding  either  to  expected  factors  of  aid  effectiveness  or  to 
handicaps to development. It is notably argued that vulnerability to exogeneous shocks and 
low level of human capital should be considered as selectivity criteria. Taking these other  
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criteria  into  account  dramatically  changes  the  assessment  of  donor  selectivity.  This  is 
evidenced through several methods of assessment of aid selectivity. 
  
After  stating  those  principles  which,  in  our  opinion,  should  form  the  basis  of  any 
measurement  of  the  aid  selectivity,  and  thereby  clarifying  the  limits  met  by  the  recent 
analyses on selectivity, we show how donor ranking can be reversed according to the criteria 
used to assess aid selectivity. We use successively two methods of assessment, one referred to 
as the elasticity approach, the other as the recipient average profile approach. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines some principles for the assessment of 
aid selectivity, while the next three sections investigate three different ways of measuring it: 
selectivity measured according to a dichotomic criterion (section 3), selectivity measured by 
elasticities from an aid allocation model (section 4) and selectivity measured by an average 
profile of recipient countries (section 5). Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Some Principles for the Assessment of Aid Selectivity. 
 
Selectivity of total aid as opposed to selectivity of each donor  
 
The  analysis  of  selectivity  can  either  be  conceived  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  the 
allocation of total aid (from all sources)  approaches an optimal allocation, or look at the 
degree  to  which  each  source  of  aid  conforms  to  the  criteria  of  optimal  allocation,  which 
produces a ranking of donors according to the selectivity of their aid. 
 
The selectivity of the total amount of aid, as analysed by Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), 
refers to the Millenium Development Goals of lowering  poverty (taking as objective the 
maximum reduction of the number of poor) by 2015. Aid is expected to contribute to this goal 
through its effect on growth, according to an income elasticity of poverty assumed to be the 
same  across  countries.  Following  previous  studies  by  Burnside  and  Dollar  (1997,  2000), 
Collier and Dollar assume that the positive effect of aid on growth depends on the quality of 
the economic policy (measured using the indicator of the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment, the CPIA). They then design a linear program which enables an 
optimal  aid  allocation  between  the  various  countries  to  be  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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current level of total aid. This allocation is intended to equalise the marginal contributions of 
aid to reducing the number of poor per country, by taking into account three elements: (i) the 
decreasing marginal impact of aid on growth, (ii) the initial incidence of poverty in each 
country, and (iii) the quality of their current economic policy.  In other words, the objective of 
aid allocation is to maximise the sum of output increases in all the developing countries, 
weighted  by  the  percentage  of  poor  (people  with  less  than  one  dollar  per  day)  in  each 
country’s  population.  As  this  first  simulation  results  in  allocating  most  of  aid  to  India, 
Burnside  and  Dollar  constrained  aid  allocated  to  India  to  remain  at  its  current  level. 
Modifying the current allocation of the total aid according to their simulation would make it 
possible to double the number of people moving out of poverty by 2015. This study was an 
invitation to the donors to collectively reform their approach to aid allocation in order to 
accelerate the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
1. 
 
The comparative analysis of each donor’s selectivity was initiated by McGillivray (1989, 
1992),  who  uses  the  recipient  countries’  per  capita  income  as  the  single  criterion  of 
selectivity.  An  additional  stage  was  reached  by  Dollar  and  Levin  (2004)  and  Roodman 
(2004), who diversify the criteria. Dollar and Levin run a model of aid allocation (for each 
donor  on  annual  data  from  1999  to  2002,  and  then  on  a  five-year  average),  including 
explanatory variables corresponding only to the so-called "good criteria": the level of GDP 
per capita (negative coefficient expected) and the economic policy, measured by the CPIA 
(positive coefficient expected). The control variable is the population size. The per capita 
income elasticity of aid is intended to represent the sensitivity of each donor to the level of 
poverty, and the CPIA elasticity of aid its response to the quality of the receiving country’s 
economic policy. The simple average of these two elasticities (after having reversed the sign 
of the income elasticity which is normally negative) is taken as the indicator of each donor’s 
aid selectivity.  
 
The indicator proposed by Roodman (more directly inspired by the work of McGillivray) 
differs  from  Dollar  and  Levin’s  in  that  it  is  not  based  on  the  econometric  estimation  of 
functions of aid allocation. Each donor’s performance indicator corresponds to its aid volume 
adjusted to take into account the "quality" of aid, particularly its selectivity (the volume of aid 
                                                            
1 Two other studies have dealt with global aid selectivity: Cogneau and Naudet (2004) and Llavador and Roemer 
(2001) have attempted to apply the principle of social equity by allocating aid to countries whose structural 
growth handicaps most undermine the utility provided by an effort or a similar quality of economic policy. These 
two studies however adopt Collier and Dollar’s main idea of aid effectiveness depending on economic policy. 
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is lowered according to the “bad” quality of allocation). The adjustment of aid value with 
regard to the selectivity does not apply to emergency aid, the granting of which increases the 
performance of the donors whatever its destination. The aid selectivity depends both on the 
recipient  country’s  per  capita  income  and  on  an  indicator  of  its  governance  designed  by 
Kaufmann and Kraay
2. The adjustments for project aid and programme support are different, 
because David Roodman considers, following Radelet 2004, that project aid is more effective 
than programme support in countries with poor governance. The linear weights applied to the 
level of the per capita income and to the level of governance are multiplicative, so that the aid 
granted to a rich, well-governed country is equal to zero, as is the programme aid granted to a 
poor, badly-governed country. From the adjustment of the actual value of aid according to its 
quality, two indicators are provided for each donor for 2002: the value of the donor’s adjusted 
aid in proportion to its GDP, and the rate of aid quality or aid selectivity (i.e. the ratio of the 
adjusted aid to the aid value before adjustment). 
 
The  analysis  of  the  principles  on  which  these  measures  of  selectivity  are  based  makes  it 
possible to underline their main limits.  
 
Selectivity is only one aspect of aid quality 
 
Evaluating the selectivity of each donor’s development assistance does not mean measuring 
its overall aid quality, but only one aspect—the quality of geographical allocation insofar as it 
affects aid effectiveness. The modalities of the assistance given to each country are obviously 
also a factor of effectiveness. Thus Roodman (2004), in order to provide an indicator of the 
aid quality, adjusts its value not only according to the allocation (the selectivity by itself), but 
also according to its degree of tying and its fragmentation into many purposes. 
 
Moreover, optimal allocation of aid is undoubtedly not independent of its purpose (project, 
programme,  technical  assistance,  emergency),  the  conditionality  attached,  the  type  of 
financing  (grants  or  loans),  and  the  extent  to  which  the  aid  is  tied.  This  means  that  aid 
effectiveness does not depend only on the behaviour of the recipient countries, but also on the 
donors’ behaviour. Whilst Roodman takes into account several modalities of assistance to 
assess donor selectivity (which is somewhat debatable), Dollar and Levin address the issue of 
                                                            
2 Kaufmann and Kraay’s indicator is an aggregate including six dimensions: voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption. They are measured by a 
hundred variables from 24 different sources.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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selectivity  independently  of  the  modalities  used,  which  constitutes  a  first  limit  of  their 
measurement of selectivity.  
 
Selectivity is related to the objectives of aid   
 
Selectivity is basically a relative concept, as it signifies the optimal allocation of aid with 
regard  to  its  effectiveness,  which  is  necessarily  contingent  to  its  objectives,  and  these 
objectives can logically differ from one donor to another. The usual objective is economic 
growth.  However,  since  the  adoption  of  the  Millennium  Development  Goals,  the  aid 
objectives  pursued  by  the  international  community  have  become  multidimensional,  even 
though a common target is poverty reduction. Over and above the Millennium Development 
Goals, foreign aid can target other objectives that should be assessed in terms of effectiveness. 
These may include the promotion of democracy or the respect of human rights, neither of 
which have a clear link with growth and poverty reduction. Aid can also be used to finance 
global  public  goods,  which  generate  positive  externalities  to  non-recipient  countries  (e.g. 
control of pollution or communicable diseases), or it can finance post-conflict countries and 
help them to avoid the resumption of conflict and to rebuild their economies. Collier and 
Hoeffler  (2004)  also  show  that  aid  promotes  growth  in  post-conflict  countries  more  than 
elsewhere.  Finally,  some  countries,  particularly  France,  assign  specific  goals  to  their  aid 
policy, such as supporting former colonies or countries that share their language. These goals 
can be considered as legitimate insofar as they express specific solidarity or responsibility. 
They  can  also  be  justified  with  respect  to  the  criterion  of  aid  effectiveness  to  promote 
development. Certainly, the ties created by a colonial past or a common language, facilitate 
understanding between partners when aid involves a dialogue on the actions implemented and 
a transfer of knowledge, which is often the case.  
 
It is difficult for analyses of aid selectivity to take into account the diversity of the donors’ 
goals. They thus focus  on poverty  reduction  resulting uniquely from the effect of  aid on 




Selectivity  depends  on  various  recipient  country  characteristics  which  condition  aid 
effectiveness.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Recent  studies  on  selectivity  (Collier  and  Dollar,  2001,  2002;  Dollar  and  Levin,  2004; 
Roodman, 2004) are based essentially on Burnside and Dollar’s thesis (1997, 2000) on the 
relationship between aid and economic growth (used as a basis for the 1998 World Bank 
report,  Assessing  Aid),  and  fail  to  take  into  account  the  academic  community’s  extensive 
critical studies that followed Burnside and Dollar’s work
3. Leaving aside the criticisms of the 
robustness of the econometric results and those concerning the choice of economic growth as 
the sole objective of aid (mentioned above), let us briefly examine the basic questions of the 
model’s relevance and main assumptions. 
 
The assumption—presented as self-evident, yet not developed in detail—according to which 
aid effectiveness depends on economic policy and institutions, has been discussed less in its 
principle than because of the definition given of “good policy”. In a new version of their work 
(2004),  Burnside  and  Dollar  (as  done  by  Collier  and  Dollar,  2000,  2001)  use  the  CPIA 
indicator designed and used by the World Bank to determine the amount of its commitments 
per  country.  The  CPIA  itself  includes  twenty  indicators  related  to  economic  policy, 
institutions and governance
4, reflecting a broad vision of economic policy. Nonetheless, this 
indicator  poses  two  problems:  (i)  it  is  based  on  an  assessment  of  country  policies  and 
institutions by World Bank staff only and (ii) it is not available outside the Bank and cannot 
be used by either academics or other donors for their own aid allocation purposes. Finally, its 
use supposes that, in all the countries, whatever their specificities and preferences, it is the 
same kind of economic policy (defined as good) which promotes growth and increases aid 
effectiveness. This assumption has been strongly criticised by Kanbur (2004), McGillivray 
(2004) and Michaïlof (2004).     
 
More important, however, is to acknowledge that aid effectiveness in terms of growth does 
not depend only (and perhaps not even mainly) on the recipient’s economic policy. Other 
factors,  which  have  been  econometrically  tested,  intervene.  The  importance  of  economic 
vulnerability, for instance, has been identified (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001), i.e. shocks 
to which many developing countries are particularly exposed, either through their foreign 
trade, notably because of the variations in the international prices of primary commodities, or 
due to climatic incidents or natural disasters. These factors both have a negative impact on 
growth and increase aid effectiveness. Indeed, in the countries facing shocks, aid can avoid 
                                                            
3 Cf. Amprou and Chauvet (2004) for a survey on these criticisms and their consequences for aid selectivity.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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shortfalls in imports and the slowdown of growth, as well as the cumulative decline that often 
ensues. The higher the amount of aid, the more it relatively dampens the macroeconomic 
impact of shocks; that is to say, aid is marginally more effective in more vulnerable countries 
or, in other words, aid decreases the negative impact of the vulnerability.  
 
The analysis of the ways in which aid effectiveness is influenced by the recipient country’s 
vulnerability  and  by  factors  other  than  economic  policy  has  been  developed  in  several 
directions.  Studies have highlighted the specific effect of aid provided at a time of negative 
terms-of-trade  shocks  (Collier  and  Dehn,  2001)  or  in  post-conflict  situations  (Collier  and 
Hoeffler, 2004). Following on from their earlier studies, Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) 
highlight  how  several  factors  simultaneously  influence  aid  effectiveness.  Their  findings 
indicate that economic vulnerability (measured, this time, simply through the instability of 
exports and the terms-of-trade trend) increases aid effectiveness. Political instability, on the 
other hand, decreases effectiveness, unless such instability occurs in neighbouring countries, 
in which case, effectiveness is increased. The quality of infrastructure and education also 
brings about an increase. As for the level of human capital, however,  other authors have 
recently supported the view that aid effectiveness is marginally higher in countries where this 
level is lower (Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey, 2004).  
 
Regarding  economic  policy,  the  critique  of  the  current  view  does  not  only  concern  the 
robustness of the econometric results or the indicator selected, it also concerns the assumption 
that donors cannot influence  recipients’ economic policies. Case studies, published in the 
book Aid and Reform in Africa (Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 2001) and carried out on 
the initiative of the World Bank, reveal that, in many instances, aid had indeed influenced the 
countries’ economic policy. If such is the case, aid has a role to play in those countries where 
there is a particular need to improve economic policy. Thus, in the above-mentioned study by 
Chauvet and Guillaumont, aid effectiveness appears much more effective if the present policy 
is “good” and the former policy was bad and thus perfectible. 
 
The fact that the analyses of selectivity retain only good economic policy or good governance 
as a factor of aid effectiveness is thus the third limitation of these studies
5. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4  The CPIA is also used by Dollar and Levin (2004) in their study of aid selectivity 
5 This point is emphasised in McGillivray (2003b). He proposes different criteria for aid selectivity: political 
stability, democracy, post-conflict reconstruction and economic reconstruction.   
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Selectivity is meaningful only for discretionary aid 
 
A difficult question is to determine which concept of aid is the most appropriate for assessing 
selectivity. The authors who have assessed aid selectivity have preferred to use the Official 
Development Assistance disbursements rather than the commitments, whereas a priori the 
latter  represent  the  donors’  intentions  better  than  the  disbursements  (Dudley  and 
Montmarquette, 1976), and more accurately reflect actual policy. The reason advanced for 
this is that, if commitments are durably higher than disbursements, this expresses a "tendency 
of certain donors to promise more than they can realistically deliver, or a failure to learn from 
history that certain recipients cannot absorb aid as fast as donors hope " (Roodman 2004, p.5).  
 
Another point of discussion is whether the gross or net flows of aid should be considered. 
Whereas  Dollar  and  Levin  refer  to  the  gross  disbursements,  Roodman  chooses  the  net 
transfers,  i.e.  he  deducts  the  whole  debt  service  (principal  and  interests)  from  gross  aid, 
because net transfers are a better measurement of the cost for the donors and the benefit for 
the receivers. Roodman’s choice is related to his objective: to establish an indicator of donor 
performance taking account of both aid volume and aid quality. The question of whether to 
use gross or net aid is related to the treatment of debt cancellations. Should one exclude from 
aid  flows  the  share  attributable  to  the  debt  cancellations,  as  these  relate  to  loans  granted 
beforehand and generally result from decisions taken on the international scene? Given the 
importance of debt cancellations in development aid, their inclusion involves a risk of strong 
bias in the assessing the aid allocation of each donor. However, this bias is less significant if 
one considers the gross rather than the net flow of aid, as in Dollar and Levin’s paper, since, 
unlike net flows, gross flows are affected only by the cancellation of commercial debts
6. 
 
A final question is whether development aid only should be considered, or if emergency aid 
should also be included (as Roodman does, unlike Dollar and Levin), since the latter should 
not be dissociated from development goals. However, the reasons for offering emergency aid 
                                                            
6 According to DAC guidelines, a cancellation of concessional debt (corresponding to an initial loan which had 
been included in ODA when it was disbursed) is not included in gross ODA, except for the present value of the 
interest payment reduction that this cancellation produces. However, the cancellation of a commercial debt is 
added to gross ODA, since the cancellation takes the form of an automatic repayment of its reimbursements to 
the debtor country. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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are different from those for development aid and its allocation depends on specific, even 
random, events such as natural disasters or wars
7. 
 
In short, the current analyses of aid selectivity come up against three main limitations: the 
focus  on  a  single  objective  for  aid,  the  assumption  that  aid  effectiveness  with  regard  to 
economic growth depends exclusively or mainly on economic policy and institutions, and the 
measurement of aid which poorly reflects the discretionary choices of the donors.  
 
In what follows, we will try to push back these limitations of the current studies on selectivity. 
We will show that the assessment of the various donors’ aid selectivity, such as it was put 
forward  by  the  Global  Monitoring  Report  (2004),  is  largely  modified  when  we  take  into 
account  the  different  factors  affecting  aid  effectiveness,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  when  we 
consider  that  donors  can  legitimately  have  other  goals  that  maximum  poverty  reduction. 
Moreover, in order to better focus on "discretionary" aid, we use, as do Dollar and Levin, 
gross disbursements rather than net transfers, considering that the former better represent the 
choices  of  aid  allocation.  For  the  same  reason,  but  unlike  these  authors,  we  deduct  the 
disbursements  corresponding  to  debt  cancellation,  and,  like  them,  we  deduct  emergency 
assistance from ODA (the Development Aid Committee’s aggregate)
8.  
 
Three categories of selectivity measurement are successively presented for the year 2003, the 
last year for which data were available. The first, directly echoing the Global Monitoring 
Report (2004), uses only one criterion. The second, following Dollar and Levin, uses aid 
elasticities to the "virtuous" determinants of aid allocation. The third type of measurement, 
starting from Roodman’s analysis, calculates an average profile of the recipients by donor. 




3. Selectivity with regard to only one criterion: a dichotomic approach.  
 
Let us  start quite simply by taking the graph in which the Global Monitoring Report 2004 
(Chapter "Providing more and better aid"), summarises its analysis of the level and quality of 
                                                            
7In 2003 for instance debt cancellation plus emergency aid represented 40% of ODA gross disbursements to  
Sub-Saharan Africa. (Source OECD)  
8 DAC’s ODA statistics include emergency assistance. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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the aid of the various bilateral donors. We then compare this with an alternate graph that is 
based  on  the  distinction  between  the  Least  Developed  Countries  (LDCs)  and  the  other 
developing countries (Guillaumont, 2004). 
 
Selectivity based exclusively on the CPIA  
 
 As on some roman churches’ tympana depicting the Last Judgement, the Global Monitoring 
Report 2004 divides aid-recipient countries into two equally-sized groups, on the sole basis of 
the CPIA: those with “good” policies and those with “bad” policies (or institutions). The 
graph locates each donor according to the volume of aid (per capita of the donor country) 
granted to both categories of recipients, represented along the axes (cf. Graph 1). The donors 
located below the bisectrix are indicated as having a low aid selectivity and conversely. It is 
the angle with respect to the horizontal axis that indicates the degree of selectivity, and not the 
distance from the diagonal, as an over-hasty reading of the graph might suggest. The further 
the donors are located from the origin, due to the significant volume of aid allocated, the more 
they visually deviate from the diagonal (e.g. France, who thus appears in a rather unenviable 
position…).  
 
The position of the donors above or below the diagonal clearly depends on the cursor chosen 
to classify the recipient countries as either "good" or "bad". Here, the cursor is the median of 
the CPIA, which does not allow for a high degree of differentiation since a good number of 
countries are grouped around this median
9. Although the Global Monitoring Report 2004 
acknowledges that it is normal to take into account shocks and post-conflict situations in aid 
allocation, only the quality of the economic policy measured by the CPIA is visualised in the 
Graph 1. Far from emphasising the limits and relativity of Dollar and Levin’s method, the 
authors of the Global Monitoring Report present the conclusions of the analysis (which they 






                                                            
9 Berg (2003, p.22) already pointed out this limit for Collier and Dollar’s study. 
10 The use of Dollar and Levin’s work by the Global Monitoring Report 2005 is less caricatural, since the 
recipient countries are classified according to their CPIA in three (instead of two) groups, so that Graph 1 is 
replaced by a diagram. However the tonality remains the same. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Selectivity based on the category of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)  
 
In order to illustrate the particular vision of aid selectivity given by the above graph, we 
replaced the CPIA median by the criterion of membership or not of the category of the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), officially defined by the United Nations to identify among the 
low income countries those suffering the most from structural handicaps to growth (cf. Graph 
2). The choice of this criterion can be easily justified. The developed countries are committed 
to a target of 0.15% of their GNP as overseas development assistance (ODA) to this category 
of countries. The membership of developing countries to this category is governed by three 
criteria (United Nations, 2000): they have (i) a low level of income per capita, (ii) a low level 
of human capital or (iii) a high level of economic vulnerability. The level of human capital 
(Human Assets Index: HAI) is measured by two health indicators (child survival at age five 
and calorie intake per  capita, expressed as  a percentage of the needs)  and two  education 
indicators  (adult  literacy  rate  and  secondary  enrolment  ratio).  Economic  vulnerability 
(Economic Vulnerability Index: EVI) is measured by several indicators, which have been 
recently  refined:  four  indicators  representing  exposure  to  shocks  (small  population  size, 
expressed  in  logarithms,  remoteness  from  main  world  markets,  the  share  of  agriculture, 
forestry  and  fisheries  in  GDP,  and  concentration  of  goods  exports),  and  three  indicators 
representing the size of the shocks (instability of  goods and services exports, instability of 
agricultural production, percentage of the population displaced by natural disasters).  
 
Each of these three criteria stands as a reason to support LDC’s through aid allocation.  There 
are two reasons for allocating aid according to a country’s economic vulnerability. First, as 
seen above, structural vulnerability reinforces aid effectiveness and, second, it constitutes a 
structural  handicap  to  growth  that  should  be  offset.  The  first  reason  is  a  principle  of 
effectiveness and the second a principle of equity. The low level of human capital is also a 
handicap  to  growth,  but  probably  not,  at  least  in  the  immediate  future,  a  factor  of  aid 
effectiveness. On the other hand, in the long run, the actions to promote human capital most 
probably  help  to  increase  the  absorptive  capacity  of  aid  and  thus  its  effectiveness.  The 
criterion of human capital is perfectly consistent with the Millennium Development Goals, as 
is the income per capita criterion, which reflects the extent of poverty.  
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Comparison of the two criteria  
 
If the position of the most virtuous donors (Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden) is barely modified, it is not the same for the countries closer to the diagonal: thus 
Japan passes below the diagonal, whereas France moves above it. The change is most evident 
for the case of France, reflecting the fact that, compared to other donors, France gives more 
weight in aid allocation to growth handicaps than to economic policy or governance, at least 
as it is expressed in the CPIA.  
 
4. Selectivity measured by aid elasticities from a model of geographical allocation  
 
Here we follow the method used by Dollar and Levin, and we analyse the consequences of 
using  different  criteria  to  measure  multilateral  and  bilateral  donors’  selectivity.  It  is 
unfortunately impossible to reproduce Dollar and Levin’s results, since the CPIA remains 
confidential, although it is used in an official World Bank and IMF report to assess donors’ 
behaviour. Hence, we took Kaufman and Kraay’s governance index (also used by Roodman)  
instead of the CPIA. 
  
Estimating four alternative functions of aid allocation   
 
For each donor, we considered aid per capita allocated in 2003
11 to developing countries as a 
function of their per capita GDP and alternatively of three other variables, namely Kaufman 
and Kraay’s indicator of governance (KKI), the revised index of economic vulnerability (EVI) 
and the index of human capital (HAI). The last two indices are calculated by the United 
Nations’ Committee for Development Policy (CDP) in order to identify the LDCs
12. All the 
variables are expressed in logarithms so as to obtain elasticities
13. The use of the indicator of 
governance (KKI) makes it possible to establish an index of selectivity in the Dollar-Levin 
fashion, which we named "focused on governance". The use of the second indicator (EVI) is 
consistent with the work of Guillaumont and Chauvet and leads to a selectivity index "focused 
on vulnerability". The use of the third indicator (HAI) refers more directly to the Millennium 
                                                            
11 Last year available in terms of statistics. 
12 We here use the EVI as  revised by the CDP in March 2005 and calculated from  data as available for the last 
review of the list of LDCs in 2003.   
13 The dependent variable is per capita aid (for each recipient country) instead of global aid. We do not introduce 
the population size into the explanatory variables, since it is one of the components of the EVI index (a small CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Development  Goals.  Each  index  of  selectivity  is  the  simple  average  of  aid  elasticities 
(expressed according to the expected sign)
14 with regard to the per capita GDP and to the 
second indicator selected, as done by Dollar and Levin for the two elasticities they estimated 
(with regard to the per capita GDP and the CPIA). In order to obtain a composite indicator of 
selectivity, we then simultaneously estimated the elasticities with regard to the four variables 
(GDP per capita, EVI, HAI, KKI)
15. 
 
A radically changed ranking of donors  
 
It appears clearly that donor ranking changes dramatically from one indicator to the other in 
Table 1, which gives the results for each donor and in Table 2, which presents a synthetic 
view of the differences in ranking. First of all, let us compare Dollar and Levin’s ranking with 
those  which  take  into  account  the  two  growth  handicaps,  resulting  from  vulnerability  to 
external shocks or from weak human capital. The various United Nations agencies, as do 
bilateral donors such as Portugal, France and, to a lesser degree, Ireland, Spain and Italy—
which are among the least selective donors in the canonical meaning—go up appreciably in 
the ranking based on the level of the human capital (HAI). The same change appears again for 
Portugal and United Nations agencies, as well as for Greece and the Development Banks, 
with the ranking based on vulnerability. If we now consider the ranking established with the 
composite or global selectivity index, the inversion of ranking is particularly striking for the 
United Nations agencies, which gain 27 to 5 ranks and for Portugal (ranked 31st out of 42 
donors by Dollar and Levin), which becomes 6
th and first of the bilateral donors), whereas 
France gains only two ranks (30
th instead of 32
nd out of 42). On the contrary, the United 
Kingdom goes down sharply (minus 35 ranks), as do Austria (minus 30 ranks), and Sweden 
(minus 28 ranks), due to little weight these countries give to the level of human capital and 
recipients’ vulnerability in their aid allocation. This is also the case, but to a lesser extent, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
population is considered as a factor of greater vulnerability to external shocks). This approach ends up imposing 
a unitary elasticity of aid to population. 
14 For good selectivity, we expect a negative coefficient for the per capita income and the human assets index 
(HAI) and a positive coefficient for the governance indicator and the vulnerability indicator (EVI). To compute 
the average of elasticities, the sign of the first two elasticities has been reversed.    
15 This method raises some technical difficulties (Guillaumont, 2004b and Roodman, 2004). When a country 
receives no aid from a donor, it is not possible to keep a zero, since log of zero tends to infinite. In this case, 
Dollar and Levin replace the zero by a low value of aid ($10.000). This arbitrary choice has an influence on the 
value of elasticities. A better solution would have been to estimate a Tobit model as done by Berthelemy and 
Tichit, 2004 and Canavire et al., 2005). Nonetheless, we have kept to Dollar and Levin’s method, since our 
objective is to compare our results with theirs. Another difficulty comes from the elasticities that are often not 
significantly different from zero. Even though the estimated value of elasticities is not a priori more open to 
critique than a zero value, this casts some doubts on the validity of the method or at least on the signification of 
the differences in the ranking. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Norway, Finland, Denmark and the United States. On the other hand, IDA as well as the IMF 
maintains a very good ranking.   
 
Moreover, we note that the two criteria intended to represent the recipient countries’ "good 
behaviour" (the CPIA and the Kaufmann and Kraay’s indicator of governance) give differing 
results for several countries. This is particularly the case of United Nations agencies and 
Development  Banks,  as  well  as  Australia,  Japan  and  the  United  States,  whose  ranking 
significantly improves when one refers to the second indicator. The losers are mainly Austria, 
Belgium, Sweden, Portugal and the United Kingdom. This comparison reinforces the feeling 
that the assessments related to policy and governance are relatively subjective.        
 
5. Selectivity measured from an average profile of recipient countries   
 
The advantage of the second method now used is to not rely on an econometric estimation 
(prone  to  criticism)  of  the  determinants  of  each  donor’s  aid  allocation.  This  method 
approaches the one used by McGillivray and Roodman. However, unlike them, we do not 
calculate a value of aid adjusted by the quality of the allocation. We are directly interested in 
aid  selectivity.  We  calculate,  therefore,  an  "average  profile"  of  the  aid  recipients  of  each 
donor, weighted by the proportion of its aid allocated to each country. This average profile 
can be calculated from as many receiver’s characteristics as one wishes. This method offers 
one  significant  advantage  compared  to  the  selectivity  approach:  each  selectivity  criterion 
included in the average profile is independent from the other criteria,  while the elasticity 
approach measures partial elasticities which depend on the level of the other variables.   
  
An average profile of aid recipients of each donor according to four criteria  
 
We here keep the four indicators mentioned in the previous section and used to measure 
selectivity by elasticities, namely the level of income (GDP per capita), the quality of the 
governance (Kaufman and Kraay’s index), the vulnerability (EVI) and the level of human 
capital (HAI). For each donor i, we calculate an average per capita GDP* of its aid receivers, 
weighted by the share of its aid to each recipient country j in its total assistance, as well as an 
average HAI*, an average EVI* and an average KKI*, weighted in the same manner 
wij = Aij / Aj  
GDP*i = Σ wij . GDPj  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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HAI*i = Σ wij . HAIj  
 
EVI*i = Σ wij . EVIj  
 
  KKI*i = Σ wij . KKIj  
 
To give an equal weight to each component, GDP, EVI, HAI and KKI are calibrated on a 0 to 
100 scale. Furthermore, we reversed GDP and HAI, in order to have the four components 
evolve in the same direction. The average profile of each donor’s recipients is then given by 
the sum of these four components. This gives an indicator of aid selectivity and makes it 
possible to rank the donors. 
 
                                                      Ii = Σ (GDP*i , HAI*i ,  EVI*i ,  KKI*i )  
 
 
so that a higher index I for donor i means that, compared to the other donors, donor i allocates 
its aid to countries either poorer, or more vulnerable, or with a better governance, or with a 
lower human capital, or a combination of these four characteristics. It is thus possible to rank 
the donors according to this index of aid selectivity (Table 3).  
 
The  ranking  thus  obtained  is  relatively  close  to  that  obtained  from  elasticities  (Table  1). 
However, the ranking improves significantly for some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Spain and Germany, and obviously worsens for others, like Greece, New Zealand 
and  Switzerland,  as  well  as  IDA  and  IMF,  who  nevertheless  preserve  a  good  ranking 
(respectively  9
th  and  13
th).  These  differences  in  results  reinforce  the  doubts  previously 
expressed about the elasticity method
16. 
 
From the same Table 3, one can clearly see the preferred criteria of each donor. For example, 
compared to the whole set of donors, the World Bank (through IDA) and the IMF
17 support—
by virtue of their mandate—the low-income countries. Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
                                                            
16 Cf. Note 11 above. 
17 Here are only considered the Structural Adjustment Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, 
and the Facility for Growth and Poverty Reduction. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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World Bank considers “good governance” to be an important criterion, which is less the case 
of  the  IMF,  even  less  the  case  of  the  United  Nations.  Among  bilateral  donors,  Japan, 
Denmark, Spain and Luxembourg are the most attached to governance. France focuses more 
on the level of poverty—measured by the per capita GDP—and on the level of human capital 
(HAI) than on governance or vulnerability, while the European Commission, and even more 
the United States, do not seem to be very sensitive to any of the four criteria.   
 
Taking specific donor preferences into account  
 
We  previously  underlined  that  assessing  selectivity  should  take  into  account  the  fact  that 
bilateral donors may logically have preferences for certain countries, mainly due to historical 
or cultural ties or because they feel that they have a special responsibility with regard to post-
conflict countries. We thus consider that the former colonial powers (France, the Netherlands, 
Portugal  and  the  United  Kingdom)  may  understandably  give  relatively  more  aid  to  their 
former  colonies  (in  a  proportion  fixed  arbitrarily  at  20%).  We  alternatively  consider  the 
possibility of a preference given — in the same proportion of 20% — by donors to countries 
that share their language. This can be justified by the donors’ strategy of defending a minority 
language by promoting the economic development of the countries speaking this language 
considered as a common public good. This leads us to identify from among the aid recipients 
those using the Spanish, Portuguese or French language. However, we do not consider that 
the United Kingdom or the United States could share the same concern of defending the use 
of English... Finally and again independently, we adjusted the profile of the aid recipients to 
take account (in the same proportion of 20%) of a possible post-conflict situation
18. 
 
The  construction  of  the  indicator  adjusted  for  the  preference  given  to  former  colonies 
consisted in multiplying by 1.2 each of the four elements (wij * GDPi ; wij * HAIi ; wij * EVIi ; 
wij * KKIi) when the donor i allocates aid to a receiver j which is a former colony. The same 
was done independently for the indicator adjusted for linguistic preference
19, then for the 
preference given to the countries in a post conflict situation, without any distinction between 
the donors for this latter preference (Tables 4 to 6). This adjustment improves the ranking of 
                                                            
18 Unlike cultural preferences, which concern only bilateral donors, preference for post-conflict countries may 
also concern multilateral donors. Cf. Annex 2 for a definition of post-conflict countries. 
19 The selectivity index has been adjusted to take into account the three following elements: 
1.  France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland disburse ODA towards countries with 
more than 33% of children enrolled in French-speaking schools.   
2.  Spain disburses aid towards countries with Spanish as official language. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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the countries likely to have specific preferences all the more since they are selective with 
regard to other criteria in allocating their aid to former colonies or countries sharing the same 
language. 
 
Not surprisingly, the new ranking shows the former colonial powers—particularly Portugal, 
the United Kingdom and France—in a better position (Table 4). A similar increase in the 
ranking occurs when linguistic preference is taken into account. Thus, Portugal, which gives a 
priority to Portuguese-speaking countries, France, Belgium and Canada (but not Switzerland), 
which give some preference to French-speaking countries, and Spain have a better ranking 
(Table 5). The adjustment carried out in Table 6 for the countries in a post-conflict situation 
also  modifies  the  ranking,  which  mainly  improves  the  position  of  Belgium,  Finland  and 
Sweden, and lowers the position of IDA and IMF. 
 
We have tested the sensitivity of the results by using an adjustment coefficient of 1.1 instead 
of 1.2. Following the adjustment for former colonies or linguistic preferences, Portugal stays 
at the first rank (versus 7
th rank without adjustment) among bilateral donors, Belgium is now 
to the 5
th and 6
th ranks instead of 4
th with 1.2 adjustment (versus 5
th without adjustment). 
France is at the 10
th and 11
th ranks instead of 7
th (versus 13
th without adjustment), United 
Kingdom, for the former colonies adjustment, is  now at the 4
th rank instead of the 3rd (versus 
8
th rank without adjustment). These results show that even a small adjustment coefficient may 




This paper has argued that there is a rationale to distinguishing global aid selectivity and 
donor specific selectivity and draws some conclusions for both. 
 
First the definition of optimal allocation of total development aid, measured for all the donors, 
raises some problems which have not been appropriately addressed in the literature. It is still 
necessary  for  the  international  donor  community  to  agree  on  satisfactory  criteria  for  aid 
allocation.  Several  different  criteria  will  necessarily  have  to  be  used  given  the  complex 
relationship between development aid and poverty reduction, as underlined by the academic 
literature. It seems, however, that an agreement should be easily reached on the four criteria 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3.  Portugal disburses aid towards countries with Portuguese as official language. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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that we have used: two poverty-related criteria (per capita income and the level of human 
capital) and two criteria corresponding to the likely factors of aid effectiveness (governance 
and  economic  vulnerability).  Agreement  on  the  criteria  not  yet  adopted  by  the  canonical 
vision of aid selectivity (human capital and vulnerability) could be facilitated by the existence 
of  the  two  indicators  endorsed  by  the  United  Nations  for  the  identification  of  the  Least 
Developed Countries (HAI and EVI). 
 
Second, based on this analysis, it seems debatable to apply uniform criteria in order to assess 
the  selectivity  of  the  various  bilateral  aids,  since  donors  legitimately  have  particular 
preferences due to specific solidarities and a comparative advantage in assistance to certain 
countries. Moreover, a donor’s selectivity can logically aim at compensating for different 
selectivity preferences of other donors. If one thus wants to compare the aid selectivity of 
developed countries, it may be advisable to seek a consensus on how to take into account 
particular but legitimate preferences of some bilateral donors, at the same time as one applies 
common criteria. We have outlined a way of doing this in the last section of this paper. 
 
The scientific issue still to be addressed is the design of a model that will make it possible to 
determine optimal aid allocation using multiple criteria. Indeed Collier and Dollar’s model is 
relatively simple insofar as it is based on a clear objective (maximum reduction of the number 
of  poor)  and,  also,  allocation  is  based  on  only  two  criteria  (the  initial  level  of  monetary 
poverty and the quality of economic policy expected to impact aid effectiveness by promoting 
growth). The principle of simulation is then to equalise across recipient countries the marginal 
contribution of aid to reducing the number of poor. This model, however, does not allow the 
structural  handicaps  of  the  recipient  countries  to  be  taken  into  account  simultaneously. 
Vulnerability  could  be  introduced  into  this  model  as  it  increases  aid  effectiveness  by 
promoting growth (as  good economic policy),  but it is not the same for the weakness of 
human capital. In order that aid be allocated according to both the structural handicaps to be 
offset  and  the  characteristics  of  recipient  countries  which  condition  aid’s  effectiveness,  it 
would be advisable to design a model based on an objective other than that of Collier and 
Dollar.    
 
Once a desirable allocation of total development aid has been determined, each international 
institution and each bilateral donor would have the responsibility of indicating the share of aid 
which each recipient country that it wishes to finance should ideally receive. This should be CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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done  with  each  donor  country  clearly  stating  its  own  criteria  of  selectivity.  The  share 
attributed to each donor should be negotiated with all the other donors, in order to explicitly 
take into account the donors’ interdependence in global aid allocation. . One could consider 
that  the  international  institutions  have  the  responsibility  to  give  aid  in  priority  to  those 
countries for which the normal quota of total assistance had not been spontaneously covered 
by  the  bilateral  donors.  This  procedure  would  have  the  advantage  of  allowing  a  better 
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Graphs and Tables 
 
Graph 1 
Distribution of DAC donors’ aid according to CPIA   
Aid per bilateral donor country’s capita to low-income countries,  average for 1999-2002 ($ per capita)    
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Table 1 
Selectivity according to elasticities estimated by an allocation model 
42 bilateral and multilateral donors, 2003 
 
  Selectivity focusing    Selectivity focusing    Selectivity focusing    Global model 
  on MDGs    on vulnerability    on governance     
    Difference      Difference      Difference      Difference  Rank  
  Rank (1)  w/ Dollar     Rank (1)  w/ Dollar     Rank (1)  w/ Dollar     Rank (1)  w/ Dollar   within the  
    & Levin      & Levin      & Levin      & Levin  22 bilateral donors 
22 bilateral donors                       
Australia  34  -9    23  2    14  11    24  1  7 
Austria  30  -20    37  -27    35  -25    39  -29  19 
Belgium  4  9    22  -9    36  -23    23  -10  6 
Canada  21  2    33  -10    26  -3    25  -2  8 
Denmark  15  -13    24  -22    5  -3    16  -14  4 
Finland  28  -16    34  -22    19  -7    29  -17  12 
France  11  21    31  1    37  -5    30  2  13 
Germany  27  -7    41  -21    27  -7    41  -21  21 
Greece  41  -5    25  11    38  -2    32  4  14 
Ireland  5  14    13  6    23  -4    11  8  2 
Italy  22  5    30  -3    40  -13    36  -9  16 
Japan  39  -17    40  -18    18  4    40  -18  20 
Luxembourg  17  1    14  4    28  -10    12  6  3 
Netherlands  16  -9    29  -22    11  -4    28  -21  11 
New Zealand  33  -3    15  15    32  -2    20  10  5 
Norway  18  -10    26  -18    15  -7    27  -19  10 
Portugal  8  23    4  27    41  -10    6  25  1 
Spain  31  11    42  0    39  3    42  0  22 
Sweden  25  -20    27  -22    22  -17    33  -28  15 
Switzerland  20  1    32  -11    21  0    26  -5  9 
United Kingdom  32  -28    36  -32    12  -8    38  -34  18 
United States  29  -5    38  -14    20  4    37  -13  17 
                     
(1)  Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Table 1 cont’d 
 
  Selectivity focusing    Selectivity focusing    Selectivity focusing    Global model 
  on MDGs    On vulnerability    on governance     
    Difference      Difference      Difference      Difference  Rank 
  Rank (1)  w/ Dollar     Rank (1)  w/ Dollar     Rank (1)   w/ Dollar     Rank (1)  w/ Dollar   within the  
    & Levin      & Levin      & Levin      & Levin  20 multilateral  
donors 
20 multilateral donors                         
AfDF  1  8    1  8    4  5    1  8  1 
Arab Agencies  7  10    6  11    2  15    2  15  2 
AsDF  42  -8    11  23    16  18    18  16  14 
CarDB  36  -10    5  21    33  -7    8  18  7 
EBRD  40  -12    8  20    29  -1    10  18  9 
EC  19  -3    19  -3    13  3    17  -1  13 
GEF  38  -24    39  -25    25  -11    34  -20  19 
IDA  3  -2    2  -1    1  0    3  -2  3 
IDB Sp.Fund  37  0    18  19    42  -5    22  15  17 
IFAD  13  -2    12  -1    3  8    5  6  5 
Nordic Dev.Fund  26  -20    7  -1    7  -1    9  -3  8 
Other UN  14  19    28  5    34  -1    31  2  18 
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF)  6  -3    3  0    8  -5    4  -1  4 
UNDP  12  17    16  13    9  20    14  15  11 
UNFPA  10  29    21  18    10  29    19  20  15 
UNHCR  24  17    35  6    31  10    35  6  20 
UNICEF  9  29    20  18    17  21    21  17  16 
UNRWA  35  5    9  31    30  10    13  27  10 
UNTA  23  12    17  18    24  11    15  20  12 
WFP  2  13    10  5    6  9    7  8  6 
Average of Absolute value of 
difference (42 donors) = 
11.7      13.4      8.6      12.7   
 
(1)  Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Table 2 
Summary impact of changing the measurement of aid selectivity: 
Average absolute value of  rank differences for 42 donors (multilateral & bilateral) and 
for only 22 bilateral donors or 20 multilateral donors, 2003 
 
  All 42donors  Bilateral only 
between Dollar-Levin (2004) indices and other elasticity estimates :     
Income and other governance index (KKI)  8.7  3.8 
Income and vulnerability (EVI)  13.5  7.63 
Income and MDGs (HAI)  11.8  6.09 
Global model   12.8  7.27 
     
between index based on global allocation model estimates and recipient 
average profile index 
7.25  3.63 
     
between unadjusted recipient average profile index and index adjusted 
for: 
   
Former colonies    1.72 
Same language    2.27 






 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Table 3 
Average profile of recipient countries for each donor 
 
  Selectivity focusing  
On poverty 
Selectivity focusing  
on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing  
on vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing  
on governance 
Global model 
  Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 




22 bilateral donors                      
Australia  21  4  30  -5  10  15  16  9  19  6  6 
Austria  40  -30  31  -21  36  -26  28  -18  37  -27  19 
Belgium  5  8  5  8  9  4  42  -29  18  -5  5 
Canada  28  -5  16  7  21  2  29  -6  24  -1  9 
Denmark  8  -6  14  -12  13  -11  8  -6  6  -4  2 
Finland  33  -21  20  -8  27  -15  14  -2  26  -14  11 
France  18  14  27  5  30  2  37  -5  29  3  13 
Germany  24  -4  32  -12  35  -15  22  -2  32  -12  16 
Greece  42  -6  41  -5  41  -5  43  -7  43  -7  22 
Ireland  7  12  3  16  6  13  18  1  3  16  1 
Italy  32  -5  24  3  26  1  41  -14  35  -8  18 
Japan  25  -3  38  -16  39  -17  5  17  34  -12  17 
Luxembourg  16  2  25  -7  8  10  10  8  8  10  4 
Netherlands  20  -13  19  -12  24  -17  26  -19  22  -15  7 
New Zealand  41  -11  36  -6  12  18  40  -10  39  -9  20 
Norway  35  -27  15  -7  23  -15  31  -23  27  -19  12 
Portugal  34  -3  9  22  2  29  33  -2  7  24  3 
Spain  31  11  35  7  29  13  9  33  31  11  15 
Sweden  27  -22  21  -16  22  -17  25  -20  25  -20  10 
Switzerland  30  -9  28  -7  33  -12  24  -3  30  -9  14 
United Kingdom  17  -13  17  -13  32  -28  21  -17  23  -19  8 
United States  39  -15  33  -9  37  -13  38  -14  41  -17  21 
(1)  Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
(2)   Rank within the 22 bilateral donors 
D&L: Dollar and Levine, 2004 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Table 3 cont’d  
 
  Selectivity focusing  
On poverty 
Selectivity focusing 
 on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing  
on vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing  
on governance 
Global model 
  Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (3)  
among Bil. 
20 multilateral donors                       
AfDF  1  8  2  7  3  6  7  2  1  8  1 
Arab Agencies  12  5  7  10  7  10  13  4  4  13  3 
AsDF  11  23  29  5  19  15  11  23  17  17  13 
CarDB  29  -3  43  -17  1  25  1  25  20  6  14 
EBRD  36  -8  42  -14  43  -15  39  -11  42  -14  20 
EC  37  -21  23  -7  25  -9  23  -7  28  -12  16 
GEF  23  -9  39  -25  38  -24  3  11  33  -19  17 
IDA  4  -3  18  -17  28  -27  15  -14  9  -8  5 
IDB Sp.Fund  10  27  34  3  4  33  6  31  14  23  10 
IFAD  6  5  22  -11  18  -7  12  -1  10  1  6 
Nordic Dev.Fund  2  4  10  -4  5  1  4  2  2  4  2 
Other UN  38  -5  37  -4  31  2  32  1  36  -3  18 
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF)  3  0  12  -9  34  -31  30  -27  13  -10  9 
UNDP  13  16  8  21  17  12  27  2  11  18  7 
UNFPA  14  25  13  26  16  23  20  19  12  27  8 
UNHCR  15  26  11  30  20  21  35  6  16  25  12 
UNICEF  19  19  6  32  15  23  36  2  15  23  11 
UNRWA  43  -3  1  39  40  0  17  23  38  2  19 
UNTA  26  9  26  9  14  21  19  16  21  14  15 
WFP  9  6  4  11  11  4  34  -19  5  10  4 
                       
 
(1)  Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
(3)  Rank within the 20 multilateral donors 
 D&L: Dollar and Levine, 2004 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Table 4 




  Selectivity focusing 
on poverty 
Selectivity focusing 






  Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 




                   
Australia  9  7  15  1  5  11  8  8  8  8 
Austria  20  -14  16  -10  19  -13  15  -9  19  -13 
Belgium  1  7  1  7  2  6  21  -13  4  4 
Canada  13  1  7  7  8  6  16  -2  10  4 
Denmark  5  -4  5  -4  7  -6  5  -4  5  -4 
Finland  17  -10  10  -3  15  -8  7  0  12  -5 
France  3  17  8  12  12  8  14  6  7  13 
Germany  10  1  17  -6  18  -7  10  1  16  -5 
Greece  22  -1  22  -1  22  -1  22  -1  22  -1 
Ireland  4  6  2  8  3  7  9  1  2  8 
Italy  16  1  12  5  13  4  20  -3  18  -1 
Japan  11  2  21  -8  21  -8  3  10  17  -4 
Luxembourg  7  2  13  -4  4  5  6  3  6  3 
Netherlands  8  -4  9  -5  10  -6  12  -8  9  -5 
New Zealand  21  -3  20  -2  6  12  19  -1  20  -2 
Norway  18  -13  6  -1  11  -6  17  -12  13  -8 
Portugal  6  13  3  16  1  18  2  17  1  18 
Spain  15  7  19  3  16  6  4  18  15  7 
Sweden  12  -9  11  -8  9  -6  13  -10  11  -8 
Switzerland  14  -2  14  -2  17  -5  11  1  14  -2 
United Kingdom  2  0  4  -2  14  -12  1  1  3  -1 
United States  19  -4  18  -3  20  -5  18  -3  21  -6 
(1)  Rank within the 22 bilateral donors  
 
















                                                            
20 The four indicators are multiplied by 1.2 when a former colonial power (France, UK, Spain, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium) allocates aid to its former colonies. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
 




Average profile of recipient countries for each bilateral donor, adjusted for linguistic preference
21 
 
  Selectivity focusing 
on poverty 
Selectivity focusing 






  Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 




                   
Australia  9  7  15  1  5  11  7  9  8  8 
Austria  19  -13  16  -10  19  -13  15  -9  19  -13 
Belgium  1  7  1  7  2  6  21  -13  4  4 
Canada  11  3  4  10  8  6  12  2  6  8 
Denmark  5  -4  5  -4  7  -6  5  -4  5  -4 
Finland  17  -10  11  -4  15  -8  6  1  13  -6 
France  3  17  9  11  13  7  17  3  7  13 
Germany  12  -1  17  -6  18  -7  11  0  16  -5 
Greece  21  0  22  -1  22  -1  22  -1  22  -1 
Ireland  4  6  2  8  4  6  9  1  2  8 
Italy  16  1  13  4  14  3  20  -3  18  -1 
Japan  13  0  21  -8  21  -8  4  9  17  -4 
Luxembourg  2  7  7  2  3  6  3  6  3  6 
Netherlands  8  -4  10  -6  12  -8  14  -10  10  -6 
New Zealand  20  -2  20  -2  6  12  19  -1  20  -2 
Norway  18  -13  6  -1  11  -6  16  -11  15  -10 
Portugal  6  13  3  16  1  18  2  17  1  18 
Spain  10  12  19  3  9  13  1  21  9  13 
Sweden  15  -12  12  -9  10  -7  13  -10  12  -9 
Switzerland  14  -2  14  -2  16  -4  8  4  14  -2 
United Kingdom  7  -5  8  -6  17  -15  10  -8  11  -9 
United States  22  -7  18  -3  20  -5  18  -3  21  -6 
 
 
                                                            
21 The four indicators are multiplied by 1.2 when: 
1.  France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland disburse ODA towards countries with 
more than 33% of the children are enrolled in French-speaking schools.   
2.  Spain disburses aid towards countries with Spanish as official language. 
3.  Portugal disburses aid towards countries with Portuguese as official language. 
D&L: Dollar and Levine, 2004. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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Table 6 
Average profile of recipient countries for each donor, adjusted for post conflict countries 
 
  Selectivity focusing  
on poverty 
Selectivity focusing  
on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing  
On vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing 
 on governance 
Global model 
  Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 




22 bilateral donors                       
Australia  21  4  31  -6  11  14  22  3  24  1  10 
Austria  40  -30  30  -20  36  -26  20  -10  36  -26  19 
Belgium  1  12  4  9  4  9  42  -29  8  5  4 
Canada  27  -4  15  8  18  5  28  -5  22  1  9 
Denmark  9  -7  17  -15  13  -11  9  -7  6  -4  2 
Finland  31  -19  16  -4  26  -14  4  8  19  -7  6 
France  17  15  27  5  30  2  39  -7  30  2  14 
Germany  23  -3  32  -12  35  -15  25  -5  31  -11  15 
Greece  42  -6  41  -5  41  -5  43  -7  43  -7  22 
Ireland  6  13  3  16  5  14  12  7  2  17  1 
Italy  29  -2  20  7  25  2  41  -14  33  -6  17 
Japan  26  -4  38  -16  39  -17  7  15  35  -13  18 
Luxembourg  16  2  25  -7  9  9  6  12  10  8  5 
Netherlands  20  -13  21  -14  24  -17  29  -22  21  -14  8 
New Zealand  41  -11  36  -6  12  18  40  -10  38  -8  20 
Norway  34  -26  14  -6  23  -15  27  -19  26  -18  12 
Portugal  32  -1  9  22  2  29  30  1  7  24  3 
Spain  35  7  35  7  29  13  10  32  32  10  16 
Sweden  22  -17  18  -13  21  -16  21  -16  20  -15  7 
Switzerland  30  -9  28  -7  33  -12  18  3  29  -8  13 
United Kingdom  18  -14  19  -15  31  -27  24  -20  25  -21  11 
United States  39  -15  33  -9  37  -13  38  -14  39  -15  21 
(1)  Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
(2)  Rank within the 22 bilateral donors 
                   D & L: Dollar and Levin, 2004.                        CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
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                                                                                               Table 6 Cont’d 
 
  Selectivity focusing  
on poverty 
Selectivity focusing  
on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing 
 on vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing 
 on governance 
Global model 
  Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1)  Diff. With 
D&L 




20 multilateral donors                       
AfDF  2  7  2  7  3  6  11  -2  1  8  1 
Arab Agencies  11  6  7  10  8  9  13  4  4  13  3 
AsDF  13  21  29  5  19  15  14  20  18  16  13 
CarDB  33  -7  43  -17  1  25  1  25  27  -1  15 
EBRD  36  -8  42  -14  43  -15  37  -9  42  -14  20 
EC  37  -21  23  -7  27  -11  19  -3  28  -12  16 
GEF  24  -10  39  -25  38  -24  3  11  34  -20  17 
IDA  5  -4  22  -21  28  -27  17  -16  13  -12  8 
IDB Sp.Fund  10  27  34  3  6  31  8  29  16  21  11 
IFAD  7  4  24  -13  22  -11  15  -4  12  -1  7 
Nordic Dev.Fund  3  3  11  -5  7  -1  2  4  3  3  2 
Other UN  38  -5  37  -4  32  1  35  -2  37  -4  18 
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF)  4  -1  13  -10  34  -31  33  -30  17  -14  12 
UNDP  12  17  8  21  17  12  31  -2  11  18  6 
UNFPA  14  25  12  27  16  23  16  23  9  30  5 
UNHCR  15  26  10  31  20  21  34  7  15  26  10 
UNICEF  19  19  6  32  14  24  36  2  14  24  9 
UNRWA  43  -3  1  39  40  0  26  14  40  0  19 
UNTA  28  7  26  9  15  20  23  12  23  12  14 
WFP  8  7  5  10  10  5  32  -17  5  10  4 
                       
(3)  Rank within the 20 multilateral donors 
 
The four indicators are multiplied by 1.2 for disbursements to post-conflict countries (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo Dem. 
Rep., Croatia, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Serbia & Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan). 
D & L: Dollar and Levin, 2004. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
 











AfDF    African Development Fund (African Development Bank) 
AsDF    Asian Development Fund 
CarDB    Caribbean Development Bank 
EBRD    European Bank for Reconstruction & Development 
EC    European Commission 
GEF    Global Environment Facility 
IDA    International Development Association 
IDB Fund  Inter American Development Fund 
IFAD    International Fund for Agricultural Development 
SAF    Structural Adjustment Facility 
ESAF    Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility  
PRGF    Poverty Reduction & Growth Facility  
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
UNDP    United Nations Development Program  
UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities  
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for refugees  
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNRWA  United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
UNTA    United Nations Regular Program of Technical Assistance  




 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2005.26 
 




Our definition of post-conflict countries is based on the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 
(2002 & 2004). A country is labeled post-conflict during the first four years after cessation of 
conflict. As in Dollar and Levine (2005), we focused on large conflicts, recognized by donors as 
requiring additional assistance. We therefore constrained the sample of pos-conflict countries to 
those which had UN peacekeeping operations around the time of the conflict’s cessation.   
 
The end date of a conflict was based on Collier and Hoeffler (2002) if available, or on Sambanis 
(2000) if not. Since both of the conflict databases end in 1999, for 2000-2002 we used the data on 
reached agreements for end of conflict from UN missions’ background data. If a country reverted 
to conflict within the four years after the end of a previous conflict, the post-conflict status ended 






List of post-conflict countries 
 
Recipient countries   Post confl. Years  UN Missions  End of conflict
Afghanistan  2002 UNAMA March 2002
Bosnia-Herzegovina  1996-1999 UNMIBH November 1995
Cambodia  1992-1995 UNAMIC October 1991
Central African Rep.  1997-2000 MINURCA January 1997
Congo Dem.Rep. (Zaire)  2000-2002 MONUC September 1999
Croatia  1995-1998 UNCRO December 1994
El Salvador  1992-1995 ONUSAL January 1992
Georgia  1994-1997 UNOMIG December 1993
Guatemala  1997-2000 MINUGUA December 1996
Haiti
a  1994-1995 UNMIH September 1993
Mozambique  1993-1996 ONUMOZ October 1992
Namibia  1992 UNTAG December 1988
Rwanda  1995-1998 UNAMIR July 1994
Serbia & Montenegro  1995-1998 UNPROFOR December 1994
Sierra Leone  2000-2002 UNAMSIL July 1999
Somalia
  1992-1993 UNOSOM I April 1992
Tajikistan  1995-1998 UNMOT December 1994
Timor oriental   2000-2002 UNMISET August 1999
 
a The normal four-year post-conflict period in these countries was cut short due to resumption of conflict.   
Sources: Dollar and Levin 2005, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004, Sambanis 2000, UN DPKO websites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 